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Fair financing in Germany's public health insurance:  
Income-related contributions or flat premiums? 
ABSTRACT 
Social justice in health care insurance relates to both, the utilisation of services and the 
financing of the system. With respect to the latter, in its World Health Report 2000 the 
WHO promoted a concept of fair financing that asks for contributions to health care 
financing that are proportional to households’ capacity to pay. This claim contains three 
dimensions: the rejection of risk-related premiums, the claim that all households with 
equal income should pay equal premiums (horizontal justice), and the suggestion that 
higher income should lead to proportionally higher premiums (vertical justice).  
In this paper we first discuss the normative dimension of fair financing and develop a 
slightly modified version of the WHO’s normative framework. Second, empirical find-
ings based on WHO data and on data from the ECuity project are presented for selected 
countries. While the WHO concept does not allow drawing unambiguous conclusions, 
the latter shows, that Germany’s system is regressive. With respect to the normative 
framework developed we can therefore conclude that future reforms should make the 
system more progressive. Against this background, two recent alternative strategies for 
reforming health financing, the Bürgerversicherung and the Gesundheitsprämie, are 
discussed. While both reform options are to be judged as more or less equivalent regard-
ing horizontal justice and the rejection of risk-related premiums, some evidence is given 
towards the inferiority of the Gesundheitsprämie model with respect to vertical justice. 
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Fair financing in Germany's public health insurance:  
Income-related contributions or flat premiums? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
After World War II Germany established a model of welfare capitalism, which became 
known as “Soziale Marktwirtschaft” (Erhard/Müller-Armack 1972). According to this 
model, the role of the state is twofold: on the one hand it has to set the framework for a 
competitive market environment in order to achieve an optimal resource allocation and 
on the other hand it has to correct “undesired” results of this market process – in par-
ticular with respect to distribution. Social insurance schemes as well as tax and transfer 
systems, correct market outcomes through their ability to redistribute income and 
wealth. Hence, one of the most important functions of the (welfare) state is to guarantee 
social justice. Social justice has become the central concern in the definition, the accep-
tance and in the legitimisation of social insurance schemes. Therefore it is a highly sen-
sitive issue also for (de)legitimising health care systems.  
”Just health care”, as shorthand for social justice in health care systems, refers to two 
aspects: the financing and the service provision of health care. With respect to service 
provision, the issue of concern is equal access to services for all people in need of health 
care. It is well known that even in systems with de jure equal rights of access de facto 
utilisation of services is heavily biased towards the middle and upper classes of society 
(Cooper/Sosna 1978; Townsend 1988; Cockerham 1992; Siegrist 1995). As a result, we 
observe morbidity and mortality rates, which are much higher in underprivileged parts 
of society (Mackenbach et al. 1997; Cavelaars et al. 1998). Over time, differences are 
stable or even increasing (Gerdtham/Johannesson 2000, Kühn 1993; Pappas et al. 1993; 
Daly et al. 1998; Phillimore et al. 1994; Dreyer/Whitehead 1997; Shaw et al. 1999; Pek-
kanen et al. 1995; Hallqvist et al. 1998; Valkonen 1998). The mode of financing, how-
ever, can also be evaluated with respect to social justice. This paper only deals with the 
latter aspect of just health care.  
Although social justice is a central feature in the discussion about the German health 
care system, respective criteria are not expressed explicitly (Nullmeier/ Voruba 1995). 
Hence, a normative framework is needed in order to discuss ”fair financing”. In section 
2 such a framework is developed starting from a recent approach from the WHO and the 
criticism it has provoked. In section 3 this framework is applied to different modes of 
health care financing in order to identify the meaning of ”just” taxes, contributions and 
out-of-pocket payments. In section 4 the topical German debate about a reform of health 
care financing is taken up. With respect to the normative framework developed, the sta-
tus quo and two reform options are discussed, namely the Bürgerversicherung and the 
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Gesundheitsprämie. The conclusion of these discussions and their implications for the 
changing role of the state in health care systems is given in section 5. 
2. NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
In the World Health Report 2000 the WHO published a ranking of health systems per-
formance of its 191 member states (WHO 2000). This ranking was based on a multi-
dimensional measurement concept including the fairness of financial contribution as 
one performance indicator. In the subsequent sections, we first report the WHO concept 
of fair financing (2.1). Afterwards, we come to some conclusions about normative stan-
dards, which are based on the criticism of this concept (2.2). Finally, these conclusions 
are applied to the topical German discussion about health care financing. 
2.1 The WHO concept of fair financing 
The WHO perception of a fair distribution of financing in health care implies that 
”…there should be a high level of pre-payment; risk should be spread (through cross-
subsidies from low to high health risk); the poor should be subsidised (through cross-
subsidies from high to low income); [and] the fragmentation of pools or funds should be 
avoided.” (WHO 2000: 93). According to this statement, high out-of-pocket payments 
are rejected because they are generally regressive, which means that they have a pro-
rich distributive impact (van Doorslaer et al. 1999).  A health care system, which is ba-
sed on out-of-pocket financing also means that there is no (ex post) redistribution from 
the healthy to the ill. This may even lead to an insufficient treatment of those individu-
als with low ability to pay and exposes them to a considerable financial risk. Conse-
quently, a high level of pre-payment is desirable, which is – according to the WHO – 
best achieved through tax-funded systems.1 The pre-payment mechanism has to include 
the risk-pooling function.2 In order to gain from economies of scale and thereby reduc-
ing the level of contributions, risk-pools should not be fragmented to a large extend. 
Nevertheless, multiple pools can exist, provided that their size and financing mecha-
nisms allow for adequate spreading of risk and subsidisation of the poor (WHO 2000). 
The WHO report does not go into conceptual details but refers at several points to 
corresponding technical papers instead (e.g. Murray et al. 2000, Tandon et al. 2000, Xu 
et al. 2000a, 2000b3).4 Murray et al. (2000) define fairness of financial contribution as a 
                                                 
1  It is, however, difficult to see, why – in this respect – tax-funded systems should be superior to contributions-
based social insurance schemes as both types are forms of pre-payments.  
2  Modes of insurance that serve solely as an accounting mechanism, as this is the case with medical saving ac-
counts, are rejected by the WHO concept (WHO 2000). 
3  Xu et al. 2000a and 2000b remain unpublished until today. 
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fair share of the total bill for a country that households have to pay. More precisely, the 
normative claim is that a health system is fairly financed if the ratio of total health sys-
tem contribution of each household to that household’s capacity to pay, is identical for 
all households, independently of their income, their health status or their use of health 
services (Murray et al. 2000). The health system financing contribution, which should 
be identical for all households, is formally expressed as: 
i
i
i ENSY
HEHFC =  
where HEi is the per capita expenditure on health of the household i, and ENSYi is the 
per capita effective income minus subsistence expenditure of the household i. HFCi is 
the share of the household’s income that is paid for financing health care. Fairness in 
financing is assured, if every household pays the same share of income HFCi. 
Per capita expenditure on health (HEi) refers to all payment mechanisms like tax fi-
nancing (including general taxation and excise taxes), social insurance contributions, 
and contributions to private insurance as well as out-of pocket payments. Although the-
se funds flow from different secondary sources, the household is the basic unit of this 
analysis (Iglehart 1999).  
The effective non-subsistence income of households (ENSY) is identical to the hou-
sehold’s capacity to pay. This is calculated as effective income minus expenditure to 
maintain subsistence. Effective income is defined as “…the level of consumption that a 
household would seek and is able to consume, based on a life cycle perspective assum-
ing that all households share a standard discount rate” (Murray et al. 2000: 14). In order 
to compute non-subsistence income, expenditures for food are subtracted from effective 
income (Xu et al. 2003). Due to the specific concept, the definition of expenditure to 
maintain subsistence does not include expenditure on health. 
The claim of the WHO is that – if a health system wants to meet the requirements of 
fairness in financing – the HFC of all households (i...n) should be identical, which 
means that the HE is proportional to the household’s capacity to pay. This claim con-
tains three dimensions, which are the very core of the WHO concept:  
(a) the rejection of risk-related premiums,  
(b) the claim that all households with equal disposable income should make equal 
contributions to health care financing (horizontal justice), and  
(c) the suggestion that higher income should lead to proportionally higher contri-
butions leading to a constant share of income contributed to the nation’s health 
care financing (vertical justice).   
                                                                                                                                               
4  We consider the elaboration within the technical papers as a coherent part of the WHO concept and therefore do 
not discriminate between the concept as described by the WHO versus the description in the technical papers. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 26) 
- 4 - 
Moreover, no household should impoverish because of an excessive burden of financing 
health care. Therefore, it is necessary to define a margin from which on payments for 
health care, which are measured as a share of income, are to be considered as catastro-
phic. The WHO assumes that households, which spend 50% or more of their non-food 
expenditure on health care are likely to be impoverished (WHO 2000). 
In order to corroborate their strong statement for proportional financing, the WHO 
tested ”social” preferences by an accompanying survey. A look at the questionnaire 
reveals that progressive financing was no response option in this survey5. From our 
point of view, this neglect is critical and leads to biased results. The survey was also 
heavily criticised for technical reasons (Williams 2001). It was conducted via internet 
by placing a questionnaire on the WHO website (Gakidou et al. 2000, Murray et al. 
2000). About half of the 1,007 respondents were WHO staff members and half were 
visitors of the website. Although certain inconsistencies of answers were admitted by 
the research team (Gakidou et al. 2000) and no representativeness could be claimed for 
the survey, the results were taken as a validation of the normative concept. It is to assert, 
however, that – other than pretended by the WHO – proportionality, as widely accepted 
criteria for fairness of financial contribution, could never be confirmed by empirical 
results.  
2.2 Discussion 
Altogether, the WHO concept is to be judged as a bold approach to set a normative fra-
mework and thereby fills a gap in discussions about the evaluation of health care sys-
tems. It has to be acknowledged that such approaches generally provoke a range of cri-
ticism, because it is the nature of normative questions that there can be no right or 
wrong and no scientific settlement about disputes on value. Therefore, all we can do is 
to reveal contradictions within the concept and to point out our own position.  
The concept of the WHO does neither relate to justice in the access to health care nor 
to the utilisation of health services. However, it also does not purport to capture these 
two issues (Wagstaff 2001). Thus, fairness in financing is solely concerned with the 
principle of contribution related to the ability to pay, but not with the principle of re-
ceiving care according to need. We accept this normative framework of the WHO in so 
far that we agree to the rationale to separate health care financing from utilisation when 
discussing the issue of social justice. Like (almost) all economists, we also think that 
                                                 
5   The five options to the question of the “Preferred financing mechanism for a health system” were: 1. Everyone 
pays the same amount 2. Everyone pays for what they receive 3. Everyone pays an equal share of their income 4. 
Everyone pays an equal share of their disposable income 5. The richest 10% pay for everyone (Murray et al. 
2000: 11). The most frequently given answer was No. 4. (The reader may make up his own mind concerning the 
question, whether this survey reflected the alternative financing mechanisms adequately.) 
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(any kind of) insurance against health risks is favourable for risk avoiding individuals 
(Arrow 1963). Due to this out-of-pocket payment is generally undesirable as it reduces 
the redistribution from the healthy to the ill. As health economists have highlighted, 
however, there might be a counter-argument as the complete absence of cost-sharing 
elements might encourage moral hazard behaviour. Thus, in order to raise efficiency, 
small out-of-pocket payments may be suitable – an insight also acknowledged by the 
WHO.  
This issue of ex post redistribution has to be distinguished from the ex ante redistri-
bution from good to bad risks. In this respect we share the WHO’s firm statement a-
gainst risk-related premiums and state that the subsidisation of the less favourable risk 
should be at the core of every just health care system. From a Rawlsian perspective, we 
can assume that all individuals behind the ”veil of ignorance” wish to protect them-
selves against the risk of impoverishment due to possible health risks and therefore ask 
for an ex ante redistribution from better to worse risks.  
The most important criticism of the WHO’s normative concept, however, relates to 
the requirement of proportionality. Concerning vertical justice, the authors make clear 
that by their requirement of proportionality, the extent to which income is redistributed 
through a health care system should be limited. As the authors explain, ”Societies may 
have a very important social goal to redistribute income […] but this can be achieved 
through many mechanisms unrelated to the overall financing of the health system” (see 
Murray et al. 2000: 9). This contradicts the normative concept underlying most tax fi-
nanced health care systems with progressive tax financing where higher income leads to 
more than a proportional rise in contributions.  
To straighten out our argument, we make clear that we do not challenge the notion 
that contributions should rise with income nor that a proportional payment system is 
superior to a regressive one. However, a system that additionally redistributes income 
from the rich to the poor is to be rated as more equitable according to our persuasion. 
Although defining the appropriate extent of vertical redistribution is a continuing prob-
lem for economists, philosophers, and political theorists (Barr 1992), we purport that a 
progressive system satisfies the criteria of social justice to a higher degree than a pro-
portional one. Thus, in line with Wagstaff (2001, 2002), we argue that a health care con-
tribution scheme should be at least proportional. With these refinements in mind, we use 
the WHO concept as a normative framework for the German reform options to be dis-
cussed in part 4.  
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3. MEASURING FAIR FINANCING 
3.1 The WHO concept 
Now that we have drawn the outline and summarised the main critique of the normative 
framework underlying the WHO concept, it is straightforward to focus on the opera-
tionalisation as well as on the empirical measurement of fairness in financing. For 
measuring purposes, the WHO has constructed an Index of Fairness of Financial Con-
tribution (IFFC). For the computation of the index, the research team collected and es-
timated data, which are based on household surveys. 
The IFFC relates individual variations in health financing contribution share (HFC) 
to its mean distribution HFC . In so far, it is comparable to variance measure in statistic 
equation. The formula is: 
n
HFCHFC
IFFC
n
i
i
125.0
41 1
3∑
=
−
−=  
The use of the cubic term instead of the square (as familiar with variance) gives a grea-
ter weight to values far from the mean (Wagstaff 2001). It weights highly that house-
holds which have spent a large share of their effective income on health and therefore 
particularly reflects those households at risk of impoverishment from high levels of 
health expenditure (WHO 2000). 
The IFFC ranks from 0.0 to 1.0 and takes the value of 1.0 when every household 
pays the same fraction of their capacity to pay for health care. Therefore, an IFFC-value 
of 1.0 means complete equality of health system financing contribution share, which in 
turn means complete fairness in financing as understood by the WHO. 
In order to compute the IFFC, empirical data of the distribution of household’s fi-
nancial contribution to health care (HEi) and the household’s capacity to pay (ENSYi) 
were required. Both components were estimated using household survey data on income 
and household expenditure data for the year 1997. The households’ income was as-
sessed by a survey on households’ expenditure. The survey period was set to be one 
month. In some cases, when the period was even shorter or longer, data were adjusted to 
monthly figures. For information on health expenditure, the WHO drew on government 
tax documents, national health account data, national accounts and government budgets. 
When no data on tax contributions was available, it was estimated from income surveys.  
In-depth analysis has been conducted for selected countries, where information was 
available. For countries where such data was not available, the distribution of health 
financing contribution has been estimated using indirect methods based on a regression 
model and information on important covariates. All results are reported with uncertainty 
intervals in order to communicate to the user the plausible range of estimates for each 
country on each measure (WHO 2000). 
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Unfortunately, the sources describing analyses and estimates of fairness of financial 
contribution have never been made available to the public, although they were displayed 
in the references of the WHO report.6 Nevertheless, the results were displayed in a lea-
gue table in the statistical annex of the World Health Report (WHO 2000: Annex Ta-
ble 7). Results based on estimations are indicated by numbers in italics. The IFFC was 
computed from household survey data in only 19 out of 191 countries. The data were 
estimated for more than 170 countries. 
3.2 Criticism 
The positive criticism of measurement is twofold: On the one hand it is questionable 
whether the IFFC is an adequate measurement for the issues postulated by the norma-
tive framework of the WHO, i.e. the question of validity (3.2.1). On the other hand it 
has to be discussed whether the data allow for the intended measurement, i.e. the ques-
tion of reliability (3.2.2). 
3.2.1 Validity of measurement 
The IFFC will take the value of 1.0, if all households pay the same fair share of their 
income for financing health care. It decreases from 1.0 when health system financing is 
progressive or regressive, but without indicating towards which direction the violation 
of proportionality principle veers. Assuming that the IFFC should be apt to provide a 
basis for decision-making in health care reforms (Williams 2001), this causes serious 
problems for any policy-maker who thinks about an improvement of the IFFC value 
without knowing in which direction the system has to move. In so far, the index is only 
appropriate to support the WHO’s normative concept, if the objective is to assess 
whether a system is financed by contribution rates proportionally to households’ capac-
ity to pay. If any deviation from proportionality is observed, and the objective might be 
to (re-) achieve proportionality, the index is not very helpful. We do not know whether 
the better off ought to pay a larger proportion of their capacity to pay, as would be rec-
ommendable in the case of regressive payments, or because the poor ought to pay a lar-
ger share than the better off (Wagstaff 2001). Since the index sums up all pre-paid and 
out-of-pocket form of payments, deriving reform options from the value of the index is 
exacerbated. 
Similarly, a value of FFC that is different from 1.0 could result from horizontal ineq-
uity, from vertical inequity or from both. From a policy perspective, however, it is 
worth knowing, whether inequalities in health care system is due to horizontal or due to 
vertical differences. The IFFC is also sensitive to the average payment rate, which 
                                                 
6  These are two particular documents, extracted from the reference sources of the World Health Report, namely Xu 
et al. 2000a and 2000b. 
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means that it varies with different average proportions spent on health care. To make 
one last point of the lacking discriminating power of the index, the IFFC is unable to 
separate any variation of an average proportion of income spent on health care from 
different degrees of horizontal or vertical inequality.   
3.2.2 Reliability of measurement and data quality  
Three years after the report’s release Philip Musgrove (2003), a former member of the 
WHO research board on fair financing, named some deficiencies in the internal working 
process and distances himself from the rapidly collected and published results. In case 
the IFFC has been computed on survey data, the period of observation (one month) 
might be considered as too short to give an appropriate understanding of households’ 
consumption behaviour. The mixing up of expenditure data, which was assessed in pla-
ce of income data and the use of income data in order to estimate income tax, must nec-
essarily have led to inconsistencies (Klavus 2000). Most suspiciously, even now, three 
years after the release of the report, details of the empirical work have not yet been 
posted on the WHO website. 
Although values of the WHO fairness index are presented for 191 countries, in only 
19 of these the index was computed from household survey data. Most of these 19 were 
developing countries. Indirect techniques, however, as used to estimate the missing data 
for over 170 countries, could only have been applied, if the countries were comparable 
(Klavus 2000). In many developing countries, the IFFC shows a relatively low level of 
inequality. This is even more surprising since most of these countries prevail a high 
level of out-of-pocket payments. There is no possibility to locate or to explain this bias, 
since no documentation of the estimations was made available setting out the methods 
used.  
The IFFC runs from zero, which means complete inequality to one. No fewer than 
147 out of 191 countries score 0.9 or above. Thus, it could be concluded that 147 coun-
tries do not deviate much from proportionality (de Graeve/van Ourti 2003). As Almeida 
et al. (2002) state the index provides little discrimination and therefore reflects poorly 
the inequities in financing of many countries. Uncertainty intervals are overlapping, so 
the IFFC loses even more of his discriminatory power.  
The WHO admits that ”... as with any innovative approach, methods and data sources 
can be refined and improved” (WHO 2000: 143). Indeed, proposals to improve data 
collection as well as computation methods were made by some scholars (e.g. Musgrove 
2003, Klavus 2000, Williams 2001). Data collection could be refined using centrally 
collected panel data, which could be more uniform in structure. At the same time, it is 
necessary for participating countries to compromise on the accuracy of definition. A 
common forum, where methods and definitions could be discussed jointly, could be 
useful (Klavus 2000).  
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3.2.3 Discussion 
Concisely, there are two major points of concern. First, the quality of data used by the 
WHO must be regarded as poor. Hence, it is suitable to look for additional data source, 
if empirical information about fair financing is required. Second, in order to differenti-
ate whether a health care financing system is progressive or regressive another instru-
ment supplementing the IFFC is needed. In the following section we will thus firstly 
amend data from the IFFC with additional analyses from the EC funded ECuity project 
and secondly present the Kakwani Index as an additional instrument.   
3.3 Results for selected countries 
In order to give an idea of the empirical results computed by the IFFC, some results of 
the assessment of fairness in financing for selected countries are displayed in table 1. 
We have selected six countries representing the three types of health care systems, 
which are the social insurance systems (Germany and France), two NHS systems (UK 
and Sweden), and finally two systems which rely mainly on private mechanisms in fi-
nancing health care (US and Switzerland). All data are based on estimates for 1997.  
Table 1: Fairness of financial contribution to health systems, selected countries  
Rank Country IFFC Uncertainty Interval 
6-7 Germany 0.978 0.964 – 0.989 
26-29 France 0.971 0.956 – 0.983 
8-11 United Kingdom 0.977 0.963 – 0.988 
12-15 Sweden 0.976 0.959 – 0.990 
54-55 United States 0.954 0.929 – 0.974 
38-40 Switzerland 0.964 0.948 – 0.979 
Source:WHO 2000, Statistical Annex, Table 7 
Apparently, the IFFC is close to one for these examples, suggesting that the countries 
do not deviate much from proportionality. Moreover, the uncertainty intervals are over-
lapping. Germany, for example, could move five positions upwards to the second posi-
tion in the ranking, if we take the upper frontier of the uncertainty interval as reality. 
Whenever we take the lower limit of the IFFC as probabilistic, a downward movement 
by no less than 30 positions is possible. Table 1 thus reveals the limited discriminatory 
power of the IFFC. 
Apart from that, the index does not show how the selected health care systems devi-
ate from proportionality. However, since we want to discuss recent reform options for 
Germany thereafter, it is crucial to have this kind of information. An alternative concept 
of fair financing elaborated by the ECuity group7 provides this information. The concept 
                                                 
7  The ECuity group which gathered around Eddy van Doorslaer and Adam Wagstaff consists of participants from 
the following EU countries: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
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has been derived from Aronson, Johnson and Lambert’s (1994) idea to separate the re-
distributive effect of an income tax into the vertical effect, the horizontal effect and a re-
ranking effect. Van Doorslaer et al. (1999) applied this theory to health care contribu-
tions. One of the main findings of their work is that the vertical effect is much more 
important than the horizontal or the re-ranking component. The relative importance of 
the vertical effect, however, varies by source of payment.  
We therefore focus on the deviation from proportionality, as measured by the Kak-
wani index (Kakwani 1977). The Kakwani Index takes values between -1 and +1, re-
flecting regressive payment respective progressive ones. The index indicates zero when 
proportionality is achieved. The Kakwani Index can be applied to all sources of pay-
ments. It is also possible to condense all modes of payment into one index. Totals re-
flect adequately the financing mixes by weighting the different sources in line with their 
share in total health care financing. This implies that both matter in judging vertical 
equity – the share the separate sources obtain and their pro-/regressivity (de Graeve/van 
Ourti 2003). In table 2 we present the results for the same countries. 
Table 2: Progressivity indices for health care financing for selected countries 
  Public Financing Private Financing Total 
Country Year Direct Taxes 
Indirect 
Taxes 
General 
Taxes 
Social 
Insur. 
Total 
Public 
Private 
Insur. 
Out-of-
Pocket 
Total  
Private  
Germany (1989) 0.249 -0.092 0.110 -0.098 -0.053 0.122 -0.096 -0.007 -0.045 
France (1989) * * * 0.111 0.111 -0.196 -0.340 -0.305 0.001 
UK (1993) 0.284 -0.152 0.046 0.187 0.079 0.077 -0.229 -0.092 0.051 
Sweden (1990) 0.053 -0.083 0.037 0.010 0.010 ** -0.240 -0.240 -0.016 
US (1987) 0.210 -0.067 0.149 0.018 0.106 -0.237 -0.387 -0.317 -0.130 
Switzerland (1992) 0.206 -0.072 0.159 0.055 0.139 -0.255 -0.362 -0.295 -0.140 
* France: Taxes are ignored because they account for a very small share of revenue, ** Sweden: No private health 
insurance 
Source: Wagstaff et al. 1999  
Direct taxes that finance health care in all countries are pro-poor in their redistributive 
effect (van Doorslaer et al. 1999). The size of the effect is fairly the same in all coun-
tries under consideration, beside Sweden. Indirect taxes, on the other hand, are regres-
sive. Generally, that is, with the exception of Sweden again, the regressive effect of in-
direct taxes is much smaller than the progressive effect of direct taxes. Due to the com-
bined tax effects taxation in general is progressive in all selected countries. Social insur-
ance is pro-poor in all countries with the notable exemption of Germany. The existence 
of a contribution ceiling combined with the exit-option for high income earners makes 
the German system regressive. The total for all public schemes of financing health care 
                                                                                                                                               
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. Other participants are from Norway, Switzerland and the United States. The 
ECuity project is accessible on the internet: http://www2.eur.nl/bmg/ecuity/. 
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is therefore pro-rich in Germany. In all other countries public health care financing is 
progressive. 
Out-of-pocket payments are generally regressive in all countries. In Germany we still 
see a very low regressive effect of out-of-pocket payments. Unfortunately, however, all 
analyses performed by the ECuity group are based on rather old data. It must therefore 
be assumed that the regressive effect of out-of-pocket payments, after series of reforms 
have led to higher cost-sharing, is much higher in Germany today. The introduction of 
practice fees as part of the most recent reform certainly reinforced this development (see 
Pfaff et al. 2003). Private insurance, on the other hand, is not generally regressive. Table 
2 shows progressive effects of this kind of health care financing for Germany and the 
UK – though on a comparatively low level. In the UK, private insurance is mostly taken 
out as supplementary insurance. Progressivity therefore is indicating that such insurance 
is a luxury good (Wagstaff et al. 1999). In Germany, where private insurance is mostly 
full coverage, only the better off buy private insurance. Thus, regressive effects are ra-
ther rooted in the barrier to entry into the private system than within the private system. 
In sum the private health care financing, including out-of-pocket and private insurance, 
makes systems in more regressive all cases .  
Returning to the criticism of the IFFC, we find one country, France, where in sum 
nearly proportional payments are made for health care. The IFFC would value this sys-
tem the best. If progressivity is accepted as a yardstick of fair financing, however, the 
UK should be rated higher. Thus, table 2 can be used to highlight the major point of 
criticism: The UK, as the only country, shows an overall progressive system of financ-
ing, while the others deviate from proportionality in the direction of regressiveness. 
This demonstrates the necessity to differentiate between the two directions of deviation 
from proportionality, if policy recommendations are to be derived from the analysis. 
Moreover, in the World Health Report 2000 France was only ranked 26-29 (see table 1). 
This emphasises the problems of data quality and the high sensitivity of the IFFC to 
data variations. 
For the subsequent analysis of German reform options it is important to note – ac-
cording to the assessment of Wagstaff et al. (1999), that the German system is regres-
sive. It is supposed to be even more regressive to date, since cost-sharing has increased. 
Consequently, any reform leading to redistribution from the poor to the rich would im-
prove the IFFC as well as the Kakwani index and move the system towards proportion-
ality. With respect to fair financing, reform options are therefore evaluated positively, if 
they increase redistribution from higher to lower incomes and thus reduce the regressive 
effect of today’s system.   
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4. REFORM OPTIONS FOR GERMANY: BÜRGERVERSICHERUNG AND 
GESUNDHEITSPRÄMIE 
In Germany the reform of health care financing is a topic of current interest. Two com-
peting streams of reform options are prominent to this day, one option is the Bürgerver-
sicherung (citizenship insurance) that will be presented in section 4.2, and the other 
consists of all proposals that might be subsumed under the title Gesundheitsprämie (per 
capita premium). We will come to the Gesundheitsprämie in section 4.3. Both proposals 
are made in order to improve the current system of health care financing. Therefore, we 
start by taking stock of the present German health insurance system in section 4.1.  
The objectives of reform proposals are manifold. However, it is not possible to cover 
all aspects of recent reform proposals within this paper.8 As the improvement of fair 
financing is part of the rationale of both concepts, we focus on the evaluation of the 
distributive effects. Thereby we refer to the criteria, which are derived from our discus-
sion of the WHO concept and the IFFC, i.e. the refusal of risk-related premiums and the 
realisation of horizontal and vertical justice. The more progressive the financing scheme 
is, the better vertical justice is fulfilled. 
4.1 Status quo 
4.1.1 Institutional arrangements 
In Germany, nowadays about 89% of the population is covered by the social health in-
surance system (SHI). Additionally, about 2% of the population is covered by special 
systems, and about 9% has full-cover private insurance.  
The private health insurance (PHI) covers the better off employees, who have opted 
out of public schemes, self-employed, who are voluntarily insured, and civil servants 
(Beamte). At least 50% of the health care bill of civil servants is directly reimbursed by 
the government; in this case PHI covers only the remainder (Busse/Riesberg 2004). PHI 
premiums do not depend on income but on age, sex, and on health status as well as on 
the chosen benefit package. High risks are encountered by higher premiums due to risk 
adjustment, exclusion of services, and by denial of contracts. As a rule, the denial of 
contracts is observable if risk adjusted premium would exceed the regular premium. 
This is measured by the amount which a healthy individual of the same age and sex 
would have to pay, by 100% and more (Rothgang et al. 2005a). Unlike SHI, all spouses 
and children are also obliged to contribute. 
                                                 
8  For an overview see e.g. Nachhaltigkeitskommission 2003. For an in-depth discussion of the option Gesund-
heitsprämie see Rothgang et al. 2005b, and for the Bürgerversicherung see SPD Projektgruppe Bürgerversi-
cherung 2004 as well as Sehlen et al. 2004 
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The German SHI contributions depend on  income, with one minor exemption of the 
voluntarily insured without income, who have to pay a minimum amount. The premium 
is calculated on all earned income on a payroll basis. The average premium rate was at 
14.2% in 2004. All members of one sickness fund face the same premium rate. How-
ever, since competition between sickness funds is allowed, contribution rates may differ 
from one fund to another. Contributions rise proportionally with income up to a contri-
bution ceiling, which is to date 3,525 € per month.9 An exit option allows employees, 
who have an income of 3,900 € per month and over, to choose whether to join a PHI or 
to remain within the SHI. Spouses, without significant income of their own,10 and chil-
dren are co-insured without any surcharges. The self-employed may choose to ask for 
coverage by a private scheme, with the consequence that contribution depends on age, 
sex and age of entry, or they may join a public scheme where their income from self-
employment is the basis for premium calculation.  
Out-of-pocket payments have gained ground within the SHI (Wendt et al. 2005, Pfaff 
et al. 2003). In 2004 the general exemption of low income earners from co-payments 
was abolished by Statutory Health Insurance Act. As compensation, co-payments for 
the chronically ill have been limited to 1% of annual gross household income, whilst for 
every other adult member of social insurance the limit is at 2% (Busse/Riesberg 2004). 
4.1.2 Evaluation 
An evaluation, starting from the WHO concept of fair financing, shows different results 
for the two systems of financing health care in Germany. We have to conclude, that the 
PHI is not compatible with the WHO concept of fair financing. Premiums are com-
pletely disconnected from the capacity to pay11, but are instead risk-related. This is a 
contradiction to the requirement of horizontal and vertical justice. On the other hand, 
however, PHI may even rely less on out-of-pocket payments than does for example SHI 
– unless the insured opt for (high) co-payments. Nevertheless, we conclude that PHI has 
a negative effect on fairness in financing health care. The pure existence of a private 
scheme and the option for high-income earners to exit the risk-pool of the social health 
insurance makes the system regressive as a whole. 
The SHI contribution is not risk dependent but in general it is related to income. We 
therefore find horizontal as well as vertical justice rather given in the SHI than in the 
private scheme. As we see from figure 1the contribution rate is slightly progressive for 
lower incomes up to 800 €. The contribution rate is proportional to income from a 
                                                 
9  For insured persons with little income (i.e. up to 800 € per month) special provisions are made. 
10  The respective income ceiling stands at 340 €. Due to some inconsistencies, however, sometimes even a higher 
income still qualifies for family insurance (for details see Dräther/Rothgang 2004: 30ff.).  
11  For simplicity we assume that the capacity to pay is identical with income. 
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monthly income of about 800 € up to 3,525 € per month.  That is, according to the 
WHO concept,  the most desirable way of financing health care.12 All income earned 
above this margin is free of contribution, making the social insurance system considera-
bly regressive.  
Figure 1: SHI 2005: Contribution payments  
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Source: own depiction  
The income threshold for compulsory insurance (Versicherungspflichtgrenze) has an 
even stronger effect on fairness in financing13. An exit option allows high income em-
ployees, from the income margin of 3,900 € per month, to leave the SHI and to join the 
PHI. The existence of this income threshold leads to an amplification of the strong re-
gressive effect of the contribution ceiling for the SHI (van Doorslaer et al.1999). As we 
can see from the results of the ECuity project, these effects are dominant even when all 
sources of financing health care are considered together thus contributing considerably 
to the overall regressiveness of Germany’s financing system (van Doorslaer/Wagstaff 
1998). 
The marginal rate of contribution for a (hypothetical) system with a fair financing 
mechanism should be a horizontal line parallel to the income axis – for the whole in-
come range, not just for a certain income interval. Under this condition, the average 
contribution share would also form a horizontal line and we would face a system with 
completely proportional premium payments. Proportionality is a minimum requirement 
according to the WHO concept but still not strong enough for our requirement of at least 
                                                 
12  Formally, half of the contribution is financed by the employer. From an economic perspective, however, this 
”employers’ share of the contribution” must be regarded as part of the wage. In fact, all contributions are paid by 
the employees, which serves as a justification for neglecting the whole area of employers’ contribution in this pa-
per. 
13  Since figure 1 and the following figure 2 show single households, this aggregate effect cannot be displayed. 
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proportional rates. In a progressive system, marginal and average rate should increase 
with higher incomes. As we can see from figure 2, starting from a monthly income of 
3,525 €, however, the average share declines and the marginal rate falls to zero. 
Figure 2:  SHI 2005: Marginal rate and contribution share 
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Earned income from gainful employment is relevant for the premium calculation in 
SHI. All other sources of income, as savings and capital incomes for example, are not 
included in the computation of premium rates. The financial burden is therefore solely 
charged on labour and not on capital, although capital gains play an increasing role in 
national income (SPD 2004). This is clearly a violation of the principle of horizontal 
justice, which in general is perceived as unfair.  
A clear violation of horizontal justice also arises from the non-contributory inclusion 
of spouses. The WHO’s assessment of fairness in financing departs from the household 
as the basic unit.14 So – according to the concept of the WHO – all equivalent house-
holds with the same household income should pay the same contribution. In the German 
SHI, however, this principle could be violated, if the total household income exceeds 
the (individual) income ceiling of 3,525 € per month. Whenever households’ income 
surmounts the contribution ceiling, it depends on the level of individual earning, how 
much in sum is to be paid for health insurance contribution. Table 3 demonstrates this 
effect for households with a monthly income of 7,050 €, just twice the income ceiling. 
Depending on the composition of this household income, any sum between 3,525 € and 
                                                 
14  Households of different size are made comparable by adjusting household size with a simplified formula of the 
OECD equivalence scale (OECD 1982). 
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7,050 € might be the basis for SHI contribution. Deviation from the principle of hori-
zontal justice is obvious.  
Table 3:  Distributional effects of the contribution ceiling on households  
House-
hold  
Income (in Euro) of… Assessment base  Assessment 
base  
 Person 1 Person 2 Household Person 1 Person 2 household 
1 7,050 0 7,050 3,525 0 3,525 
2 6,500 550 7,050 3,525 550 4,075 
3 6,000 1,050 7,050 3,525 1,050 4,575 
4 5,500 1,550 7,050 3,525 1,550 5,075 
5 5,000 2,050 7,050 3,525 2,050 5,575 
6 4,500 2,550 7,050 3,525 2,550 6,075 
7 4,000 3,050 7,050 3,525 3,050 6,575 
8 3,525 3,525 7,050 3,525 3,525 7,050 
Source: Adaptation from Dräther/Rothgang 2004.  
The non-contributory inclusion of children could also be regarded as a violation of hori-
zontal justice. However, in this case other evaluation criteria may be applied. As chil-
dren are the future contributors to the social system, they have a positive external effect 
on the insurance collective (Schmähl et al. 2005). The non-contributory inclusion of 
children in health insurance can thus be justified provided that future effects of raising 
children are to be considered.  
As we have pointed out earlier, co-payments are generally regressive (van Doorslaer 
et al. 1999). The oppressive reliance on out-of-pocket payments in the SHI has negative 
effects on horizontal and vertical justice as well as on ex post redistribution. The in-
creasing reliance on out-of-pocket payments is not further justifiable by a minimum 
amount of cost-sharing that could be beneficial in order to prevent from moral hazard. 
Since we know from the RAND project (Manning et al. 1987) that co-payments or de-
ductibles may negatively affect the consumption of health care by the poor, we do not 
expect any beneficial steering effects.  
Reduced co-payments for the chronically ill might be considered as unfair from the 
perspective of horizontal justice when considering only one period, e.g. one year. It is 
assumed, however, that the chronically ill might have high medical expenses every year 
and should be eased from this financial burden. The WHO concept, however, is lacking 
any periodical considerations.   
4.2 Reform concept Bürgerversicherung 
4.2.1 The concept 
Bürgerversicherung is the cover-name for different reform elements that influence and 
alter some major attributes of the existing health care financing scheme without com-
pletely displacing it. Its two core elements are the inclusion of further parts of the popu-
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lation into the SHI and the expansion of the assessment basis, which is relevant for the 
calculation of contribution.  
The reform agenda plans to include public employees, self-employed, and employees 
with a monthly income above  3,900 €, who at present have a choice whether to join a 
public or a private scheme. Additionally, the abolition or modification of the non-
contributory inclusion of spouses without income is proposed.  
In order to enlarge the basis for assessment of contributions, the income threshold for 
the contribution ceiling (of 3,525 € per month) is to be abolished or at least increased. It 
is also planned to increase the individual basis for contribution by including other sour-
ces of income, e.g. savings and capital income as well as by expanding the earned in-
come basis. There are various proposals for the Bürgerversicherung, all combining at 
least some of these core elements.  
4.2.2 Evaluation 
All elements of a Bürgerversicherung mentioned above have positive impacts on fair 
financing as stated within the normative framework. The inclusion of further parts of 
the population, who to date are included in the PHI, means switching from risk-related 
premiums, without any reference to income, to contributions which are not risk-related 
but dependent on income for this part of the population. This leads to more vertical jus-
tice in accordance with the normative claim.  
Due to the exit option for high incomes, in the status quo, members of PHI are in ge-
neral healthier and earn higher incomes.15 As a result, the inclusion of current PHI 
members will most likely lead to a more equal distribution of income by directing in-
come from the rich to the poor. At the same time, more redistribution is to be observed 
from the healthy to the sick. Risk-rating practises, as currently applied in the PHI, 
would be obsolete. One of the questions concerning the legal aspects of an imaginable 
abolition of the PHI is, whether current members of the PHI can be forced to join public 
insurance or whether their claim on protection of confidence could apply.  
The inclusion of other sources of income that at present are excluded from obligation 
to contribute to social insurance, would lead to more horizontal justice. To date, when 
premiums are computed, the same overall income of two households with different in-
come structure could lead to different contributions because earned income is relevant 
for the computation of premiums, while capital income and savings are not. The effec-
tive inclusion of further income sources, e.g. capital income, savings, income from rent 
and lease, depends heavily on the feasibility to assess those diverse streams of income. 
                                                 
15  Members of the SHI with high individual risk structure confronted with an exit-option rather choose to remain 
within the SHI, while the good risks face a strong incentive to opt out. 
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Experiences made with income taxation on capital gains raises some doubts with this 
respect. 
However, if contribution ceiling persists, the improvements made concerning hori-
zontal equity by including additional income sources will aggravate unfair vertical 
treatment. The intended inclusion of further sources of income would not charge the 
individuals with an income above the contribution ceiling and would have a minor ef-
fect for those who are close to the margin. Thus, such a measure could have regressive 
effects.  
A rise of the contribution ceiling would not be an entire solution, because the ineq-
uity will only be displaced, and not eliminated. As before, we would face a regressive 
system which would be even worsened by the inclusion of other income sources. A 
comprehensive solution of the regressiveness problem is solely achievable if the contri-
bution ceiling is completely abolished. Levelling up the margin, as proposed frequently, 
has at least some positive effects on vertical equity, which of course could also be mea-
sured by the WHO fair financing index. Also the ”Two Pillar Model” of the SPD, with 
separate and different contribution ceilings, one for earned income and the other for 
capital income, leads to the persistence of horizontal inequity but might counter the in-
duced regressive effects mentioned above.  
If we consider the household as the relevant unit of investigation,  there may result 
an unequal treatment of households with identical size and income (table 3). This un-
equal treatment also rises from the existence of a contribution ceiling. If the ceiling was 
abolished, the gain would be more horizontal equality among households.16 
We have to make one concluding remark with respect to the different reform propos-
als of the Bürgerversicherung, as elaborated by the ”Kommission zur nachhaltigen Fi-
nanzierung der Sozialversicherungssysteme” by the Social Democratic Party or by the 
Green Party: All concepts contain compromises, especially when dealing with the con-
tribution ceiling, and therefore are worse than theoretical feasibilities in realising more 
fairness in financing the German health care system.  
4.3 Reform concept Gesundheitsprämie 
4.3.1 The concept 
The concept of the Gesundheitsprämie is also elaborated by various models. In a com-
prehensive and current overview (Rothgang et al. 2005b), 12 models are identified that 
emerged after 2000. As opposed to the Bürgerversicherung, a reform based on the pro-
posals for the Gesundheitsprämie would alter the existing financing system more fun-
damentally. The characteristic features of a pre-payment system, however, will be pre-
                                                 
16  For details see Dräther/Rothgang 2004. 
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served. A general agreement within all models of the Gesundheitsprämie is also that 
premiums are not to be risk-rated. The redistribution from individuals with a favourable 
risk-structure to the less advantageous will be maintained. Also the redistribution from 
male to female members will be preserved. 
The basic principle of all models is the disentanglement of income redistribution 
from health care financing. This is to be achieved by a uniform flat rate premium, which 
every mandatory member has to contribute.17 In all models income re-distribution – 
whenever required – is to be achieved by an income transfer mechanism apart from 
health insurance. In almost all models the transfer will be made through the tax-
system.18 The models vary by the absolute amount of the flat rate premium and whether 
children should also make (either the same or reduced) payments. All models refuse 
consistently the continuation of the non-contributory inclusion of spouses.  
A further common feature of all models is the proposition to separate health insur-
ance premiums from labour costs. Thus, the share of a premium that in the status quo 
model is borne by the employer, is to be disbursed to the employee. In most proposals 
the disbursement takes the form of taxable income. It is to remark, however, that the 
employers-share is currently tax-free. Considering the disbursement as taxable income, 
the financial burden would increase for all insured.  
Because a uniform flat rate payment would be highly regressive and would hit espe-
cially low income groups too hard, the establishment of an equalisation scheme is pro-
posed. According to the reform agenda, all low income households will receive a 
means-tested subsidisation of their flat-rate premium. The subsidisation-rule prescribes, 
that no individual/household should pay more than a certain percentage of its income on 
the premium. The percentage given in the models follows more or less closely the cur-
rent contribution rate of social health insurance of about 14%. In most models the trans-
fer will be financed out of general taxation (indirect and direct taxes), which paradoxi-
cally implies that the beneficiaries will themselves contribute a certain amount to their 
subsidy. 
In sum, we observe two impacts, which especially charge low income earners 
through rising taxes. One is the employers’ share, which the employee receives as tax-
able income. The other is the financing of the subsidy by a proportional payment re-
quired from all tax-payers including the beneficiaries of the subsidy.  
In order to start with the differences in the proposed models of the Gesundheitsprä-
mie, we have displayed the major variations in distributional aspects in table 4. All pro-
                                                 
17  As in the status quo, the flat rate may vary slightly between sickness funds, reflecting competitive forces at work. 
However, we will neglect those minor variations for our further considerations. 
18  In one model subsidies to poor households are to be financed by an additional flat rate premium.  
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posals containing components of risk-adjusted premiums that have also been made in 
this context are not part of the concept of the Gesundheitsprämie; these models would 
go much further with the objective to reduce distribution of income. However, we do 
quote Zweifel/Breuer and the FDP-model in table 4 in order to present even those alter-
natives that go beyond the mainstream flat rate models and eliminate all kinds of redis-
tribution from health insurance. 
Table 4:   SHI 2005 and reform proposals: Distributional dimensions 
 Income Children Spouses Risk Age Sex 
Status Quo + + + + + + 
Rürup et al. - + - + + + 
Knappe et al. - - - + + + 
Zweifel/Breuer - - - - - - 
Henke et al. - + - + - + 
Herzog-Kommission - + - + - + 
CDU - - - + - + 
Rürup/Wille - - - + + + 
BDA - + - + + + 
FDP - - - - - - 
Fritzsche - + - + + + 
CDU/CSU - + - + + + 
SVR - + - + + + 
Source: Rothgang et al. 2005b: 47.  
We will not further elaborate all features of the models. However, some major differ-
ences should be mentioned. The models differ concerning the question which part of the 
population should be included by the mandatory public scheme. Some authors’ plea for 
a comprehensive scheme, including all members of the society (Bürgerprämie), others 
prefer to preserve the PHI scheme as it is. Another proposal is to complement the cur-
rent ”pay-as-you-go” financing mechanism by some elements of funding. In addition to 
the option to finance income transfers by the tax-system, some proponents have the idea 
to finance subsidisation by an additional flat-rate premium (see Fritsche 2004). 
4.3.2 Evaluation 
With respect to our normative framework, one positive feature of these models to note 
is that no risk-rating is intended in financing the Gesundheitsprämie. Some models, ho-
wever, suggest maintaining the PHI scheme with its risk-adjusted premiums (Jacobs et 
al. 2003). Concerning horizontal justice the Gesundheitsprämie is even superior to the 
financing mechanism of the status quo. All households with equal income will have to 
pay the same premium – irrespective of the individual earnings or of the sources of in-
come. This is an improvement compared to the status quo, because, as we have shown 
earlier, the current system leads to different contributions at the same overall income 
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level. Furthermore, the abolition of the non-contributory co-insurance of spouses is an 
improvement as compared to the status quo.  
From the perspective of vertical justice, it is to state that a pure flat rate premium is 
generally regressive and therefore it has to be refused. However, given that all models 
contain the element of premium subsidies for low income earners, a more sophisticated 
evaluation is needed. Due to the flat-rate payment in combination with the proposed 
equalisation mechanism, the premium tariff is more fragmented than it is within the 
status quo. In order to shed some light on the effect of the transfers on income and pre-
mium payment, we will give a – simplified – example.  
Assume that the marginal value for the highest share of income, which has to be paid 
for insurance contribution, will be fixed at 14%.19 As the margin is fixed, it is a common 
assumption to all models of the Gesundheitsprämie that the contribution rate remains 
proportional to income for all beneficiaries of the subsidisation. As described above, the 
transfer to the low income earners is partially financed by themselves. Additionally, 
taxes have to be paid on the amount, which is according to most models of the Gesund-
heitsprämie disbursed by the employer. Therefore the burden for the lower incomes 
would in sum increase due to an augmentation of their taxable income. This is not a 
marginal effect, as it would affect about 30-50% of all insured, depending on the con-
crete features of the particular model of the Gesundheitsprämie. 
For the income earners above this level, the flat rate premium is lower than their cur-
rent contribution. As the subsidisation has to be financed, however, this has to be done 
via the tax system, which does not have a ceiling for taxable income. Therefore, for in-
dividuals with very high income this effect might even outweigh their savings. As a 
result, for the very high incomes, above the current contribution ceiling, the model of a 
Gesundheitsprämie is becoming more expensive. 
Figure 3:  Gesundheitsprämie: Contribution payments 
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Source: own depiction  
                                                 
19  14% is about the average contribution share to the SHI to date. 
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Figures 3 and 4 show the resulting tariff for a – fictitious – model with a Gesundheits-
prämie of 210 €, a tax-free disbursement of the employers’ share of the current health 
care contribution20 and a proportional tax of 2% for the financing of income transfers. 
Figure 3 shows a line with a break at an income of about 1,430 €. This is the threshold 
from which on the flat rate premium amount of 210 € is  less than 14 % of income. Re-
markably, the line keeps on increasing from this threshold on, indicating an increase in 
premium payments. In this respect the model differs from the tariff in the status quo 
model (as depicted in figure 1) which gave a horizontal line for premiums above the 
income ceiling. 
Especially with regard to higher incomes, the tariff in a Gesundheitsprämie has 
changed towards more proportionality and thereby towards more vertical justice, as 
compared to the status quo. Nevertheless, as we can see from figure 4, the average con-
tribution share still decreases with income, so we only have a partial improvement in 
proportionality while payments are still regressive in general. 
Figure 4:  Gesundheitsprämie: Marginal rate and contribution share  
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As already mentioned, it is not evident from the graph that lower incomes in sum are 
charged with higher premiums as compared to the status quo. This, however, is a major 
feature of the Gesundheitsprämie.  
5. CONCLUSION 
“Social justice” in general and “fair financing” of health care in particular are slippery 
concepts which are often used without a clear definition of the respective concept. In 
order to avoid this pitfall we have based our analysis on a modified version of the WHO 
                                                 
20  Such tax-free disbursement is e.g. part of the model suggested by the “Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung” in their annual report 2002. 
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concept of fair financing which takes into account the criticism the WHO concept has 
raised. Generally speaking we regard health care financing as fair if  
¾ there is little out-of-pocket payment 
¾ premiums are not risk-related  
¾ horizontal equity is given and  
¾ premiums are at least proportional to disposable income, while a more progres-
sive tariff is appreciated.   
Compared to these standards the current health care financing system in Germany is not 
fair as it is highly regressive and has certain elements of horizontal inequity. Due to this 
background two reform options have been described and evaluated, the Bürgerversiche-
rung and the Gesundheitsprämie. 
As we have shown, both reform options rely on pre-payment – as does the current 
system. Moreover, the Bürgerversicherung and the Gesundheitsprämie refuse risk-
related premiums. Therefore both systems imply the (ex post) redistribution of income 
from the healthy to the sick and the (ex ante) redistribution from better to worse risks. 
The exit option for higher incomes and for civil servants would be omitted with the 
Bürgerversicherung and with some reform options of the Gesundheitsprämie thereby 
dropping risk-rating practises as currently applied in the PHI. In these cases even an 
improvement of fairness in financing is to be credited.  
Also with respect to horizontal justice both reform options are more or less equiva-
lent improvements compared to the status quo. Both concepts propose to cease the non-
contributory membership of spouses without income. Households will be charged with 
premiums on a more equitable assessment basis in both cases; in one system through 
inclusion processes and by abolition of the contribution ceiling, in the other by a more 
indirect way of including all income sources. However, while the Gesundheitsprämie 
would more or less automatically include other sources of income, it is to doubt whether 
it is feasible to collect all revenues in order to enlarge assessment bases in the Bürger-
versicherung.  
The evaluation of the reforms with respect to vertical justice is more difficult. In both 
reform proposals we may assume a gain in vertical justice by the inclusion of the entire 
population into the same premium schedule, which is of course given only in some vari-
ants of the concept of the Gesundheitsprämie. In the case of the Gesundheitsprämie we 
also anticipate an oppressive  negative impact on vertical justice due to the generally 
regressive effect of flat rate payments. On the other hand, all proposals for the Gesund-
heitsprämie suggest a subsidisation of low income earners by transfer payments. In its 
report on the distributional consequences of both reform proposals, Leinert et al. (2005) 
calculated the effects on household income on the basis of Socio Economic Panel 
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(SOEP) data21. Figure 5 shows the change in household incomes for both reform op-
tions. 
Figure 5  Change in Household Income as compared to the Status Quo 
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Source: Leinert et al. (2005), conversion into Euro: own calculation. Note: Data on capital incomes, as relevant for 
the Bürgerversicherung, are collected per household. The model operates with a contribution ceiling as applied on 
31.12.2000 (3,487.50 €). Household income data for the Gesundheitsprämie is measured after all transfer payments 
and reflects maximum premium charge. 
 
We can make a clear statement for the Bürgerversicherung that lower incomes are re-
leased from the burden of financing while higher incomes are charged. In this calcula-
tion, the turning point is at an income threshold of about 47,500 € of annual income. A 
second source to which we refer  (Bork 2003), estimates for this threshold an amount of 
40-50,000 €. This result is in line with Leinert’s work. 
We see from figure 5 that especially households with lower incomes, up to about 
17,500 €, are oppressively charged with the burden of financing in the concept of the 
Gesundheitsprämie. As we have absolute numbers on both axes, it is obvious that this 
effect is highly regressive. The effect on households of middle range income is mixed; 
some of the households are released while some of them are charged. All households 
with an income between 35,000 and 62,500 €, however, are definitely released. The 
financial burden is increasing for incomes over 62,500 €. We extract comparable data 
with slightly different thresholds from Bork (2003). However, the compounded effect is 
difficult to judge without more detailed data.  
As a result we can conclude that the Bürgerversicherung releases households with 
low income and charges the wealthy. This clearly leads to a more progressive health 
care financing and thus – within our normative framework – to an improvement as 
compared to the status quo. The effects of the Gesundheitsprämie are more ambiguous 
                                                 
21  Survey data basis is from 2001 and covers 12,000 households with 22,300 interview partners and 6,000 children. 
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since both, low and high income groups, are burdened, causing a release for the income 
groups in between. If we apply the normative claim of the WHO that no household 
should impoverish due to an excessive burden of financing health care, an indicator is 
given for a bias of the Gesundheitsprämie towards inferiority. But the overall effect on 
the income distribution measured by Gini-coefficient or Kakwani-Index is unclear and 
depends on the numerical specification of the reform model. It is also to keep in mind 
that the transfer mechanism that provides a compensation for the financial burden may 
be weak in the model of the Gesundheitsprämie. This is a crucial fact also for the as-
sumption of stability of the numerical examples. It is to fear that some built-in dynamics 
in the model of the Gesundheitsprämie could lead to adjustments of contributions to 
rising health care cost with no guarantee of respective adjustment for the subsidisation.  
In terms of the legitimacy of the German public health insurance scheme, it is to bear 
in mind that –although some cut-backs were made in the recent past – the general prin-
ciple of solidarity has survived the reforms and is still reflected in the status quo (Maar-
se/Paulus 2003). As the application of the normative framework derived from the WHO 
concept shows, the Bürgerversicherung would definitely enforce the underlying value 
of solidarity. All reform options subsumed under the name of the Gesundheitsprämie, 
however, reject the redistribution of income as a constitutive element (see table 4). 
Thus, the fact that employers are released from mandatory financing of health care con-
tributions in combination with an assumedly weak transfer mechanism indicates a turn-
ing away from the solidarity principle and, hence, a change in the role of the state in 
defining the mechanism and the degree of redistribution. 
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